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Book Reviews
The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a 
Big One. By David Kilcullen. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2009. ISBN 978-0-19-536834-5. Maps. Photographs. 
Glossary. Notes. Sources cited. Index. Pp. 346. $27.95.
Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred von Schlieffen, Billy Mitchell, Hank Crump-
ton, David Galula, Sun Tzu and the late Air Force Colonel John Boyd 
focused not only on how to win engagements militarily but also by outma-
neuvering an enemy mentally in order to limit the necessity for actual 
combat. Rarely is one able to witness the work of a distinctive practitioner 
and foremost authority on counterintelligence whose ideas may ulti-
mately change the way we engage an enemy. In Accidental Guerilla, 
David Kilcullen examines and analyzes the nature and need for a revolu-
tionary change in our counter-insurgency policy through his first hand 
experiences in the theaters of Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, East Timor and 
Indonesia.
Kilcullen emphasizes that our traditional counter-terrorism and classical 
counter-insurgency models are inadequate for the conflict in which we 
find ourselves. Thus, we find a distinction between the hard-core jihadist 
and the local fighter who is therefore referred to as an accidental gue-
rilla—fighting us because we are in his space and due to his traditional 
folk beliefs. In the author's own words: "This book, like its wars, is a 
hybrid: part field study, part personal recollection; perhaps too academic 
to be popular and too populist to be purely academic" (from the Acknowl-
edgements).
David Kilcullen, Ph.D. (born 1967) is a contemporary practitioner and 
theorist of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. A former Austra-
lian Army officer, he left that army as a lieutenant colonel in 2005 and 
began working as a Special Advisor for Counter-insurgency to Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice. During 2007 he served in Iraq as Senior 
Counter-insurgency Adviser, Multinational Force-Iraq, a civilian position 
on the personal staff of U.S. Army General David Petraeus, responsible for 
planning and executing the 2007–2008 Joint Campaign Plan, which 
drove the Iraq War troop surge of 2007. Kilcullen is also an advisor on 
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency issues to the United States, 
British and Australian Governments, the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion and several private sector institutions.
Most readers will enjoy the practical and understandable approach that 
Kilcullen takes to communicate and articulate his theories and concepts. 
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Readers who are not actual practitioners in the field of counter-
intelligence will marvel at his ability to express his philosophy succinctly 
and in straightforward terms. His emphasis on the Iraq and Afghanistan 
Wars purports a unique perspective.
Quintessential is Kilcullen's emphasis on changing paradigms on all 
fronts. Traditional notions of warfare, diplomacy, intelligence and 
terrorism need to be transformed in order to succeed in these modern day 
conflicts. "Certainly, in complex, multi-sided, hybrid conflicts like Iraq, 
conventional warfare has failed to produce decisive outcomes. We have 
instead adapted existing policing, nation building, and counter-
insurgency approaches—and developed inter-agency tools 'on the fly" (p. 
292). In the intelligence realms, concentrations will have to focus on less 
traditional approaches due in part to the simple fact that those pieces of 
intelligence do not tell the entire and necessary story so that proper 
planning can be conducted.
Again, this goes to The Accidental Guerilla's primary premise, 
"enemy-centric approaches that focus on the enemy, assuming that killing 
insurgents is the key task, rarely succeed. Population-centric approaches, 
that center on protecting local people and gaining their support, succeed 
more often. The accidental guerilla phenomenon does not explain the 
entirety of the problem, which is so complex that it does not fit neatly into 
any one model" (xv).
Accordingly, Kilcullen's observations in Iraq led him to conclude that the 
United States has not pursued the appropriate course of action to combat 
global terrorism. Policy at the time was to concentrate on al-Qaeda rather 
than giving equal attention to separate but interlocking struggles that nat-
urally affect the broader struggle and conflict. Yet, he concludes the 
United States can be successful in combating this threat if it focuses on 
developing a new lexicon—changing our terminology; ensuring the grand 
strategy is based on a long-range view as well as a broad viewpoint; reme-
dying the imbalance in government capability by building non-military 
elements of national power; identifying new strategic services—
re-creating the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to create balance and 
thoroughness; and developing a capacity for strategic information warfare 
whereby there is an inter-agency message being supported rather than the 
current fractured state. This fractured state of information plays right into 
the hand of the enemy who does use the propaganda machine to his bene-
fit and is at the heart of what Kilcullen calls the takfiri objective in manip-
ulation of the locals.
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The active counterintelligence professional may not learn anything 
different, yet Kilcullen addresses the necessary principles of counter-
insurgency/counter-intelligence in such a fashion that subject matter 
experts will be propelled to heightened comprehension of the subject.
Newcomers to counter-insurgency will obviously benefit from the wealth 
of experience and information demonstrated. However, The Accidental 
Guerilla is not a quick two- to three-day read. It should be enjoyed over a 
good two or maybe even three-week span so that one can fully digest and 
understand what Kilcullen is advocating.
David Kilcullen's Accidental Guerilla is a book that brings the lessons of 
the past to life just like Ken Burns has done with his Civil War series. The 
primary difference is that the reader has the benefit of an actual leading 
expert on guerilla warfare who takes us on a live journey uncovering the 
face of modern warfare and demonstrating to us the elements needed to 
ensure a positive change in our outlook of war and what it will take to win 
now and into the future.
J. Kelly Stewart is Principal at Newcastle Consulting, LLC—a strategic 
security design and management consulting firm, and an instructor at 
Henley-Putnam University.
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Aviation and Airport Security: Terrorism and Safety 
Concerns. By Kathleen M. Sweet. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 
2009. ISBN 978-1-4200-8816-8 (hardcover). Diagrams. 
Photographs. Index. Notes. Tables. Pp xxii1, 354. $79.95.
Aviation security and terrorism have been topics of intense public scru-
tiny over the past few years, with endless prescriptions for how to shore 
up the former against the latter. Into a marketplace flooded with myriad 
books written by self-proclaimed "experts" comes Aviation and Airport 
Security: Terrorism and Safety Concerns, by Kathleen M. Sweet. The 
author is a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel with impressive cre-
dentials as an intelligence officer, an assistant air attaché to the Russian 
Federation, an instructor at the Air War College, a member of the Judge 
Advocate General (JAG) cadre, and a military/political affairs officer with 
a Special Operations Wing. She currently works as a consultant with vari-
ous firms and as a university instructor teaching courses in intelligence, 
security, and terrorism. In her introduction, the author states the book 
"contains the necessary information with which to devise a strategy that 
college students, military personnel, and police counterterrorist unit [sic] 
alike can use to educate themselves" (p. xxiii).
Unfortunately, that sentence contains a key to what is to come. I really 
wanted to like this book and at first blush it seemed a solid tome, written 
by an expert to address a vital topic. Regrettably, the more I read, the 
more I found that the book is laden with suppositions, sweeping generali-
zations, factual errors, grammatical and spelling errors, and intellectual 
overreach. In short, the book, while ambitious in scope, promises more 
than it delivers. Dissecting just the sentence quoted above, it may be use-
ful for college students to become familiar on a superficial level with the 
concepts used in the book, but military personnel and police 
counter-terrorism units have assiduously labored ever since the cata-
strophic attacks of September 11, 2001, to educate themselves on aviation 
security and terrorism. The military and police have led the way to study 
these issues and have proactively engaged in very aggressive information 
sharing campaigns to create a common sight picture.
The author does undertake a very methodical and systematic study and 
correctly identifies the importance of air travel and transport for our 
economy and way of life. However, the extraordinary depth and breadth 
of topics are an inch deep and a mile wide. The fifteen chapters have 
numerous sub-topics included that span only a page or two or three, 
allowing little room for the topic other than to mention it and give a para-
graph or two. Every topic brought up is valid but is given short shrift, 
resulting in a very unsatisfying treatment. In addition, there are numer-
ous sections copied and pasted from the Internet (appropriately sourced 
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and noted), throughout the book, which lessens the book's credibility and 
portrays a curious lack of imagination on the part of the author. Cutting 
and pasting is a practice common among sluggish and less accomplished 
intelligence analysts and is out of place in a textbook purportedly 
intended for college students.
The use of open source information seems to actually take the place of any 
real analysis or policy recommendations. The book has no real flow and is 
uneven, as if it were sloppily assembled with disparate elements welded 
together to form the final product. The chapter on terrorism unevenly 
tries to cram into a few pages what multi-volume studies on the topic can 
only allude to. The author tries to wrap in the history of the Near East (a 
topic in and of itself) along with the history of terrorism (another topic), 
terrorist group profiles (another separate topic) and then fold in case 
studies (a still different topic)—all very poorly.
Spelling errors throughout plague the book and factual errors undermine 
its credibility. A few examples follow since a complete recounting of all 
errors would be a larger undertaking than this review will allow. The 
author's spelling of al-Qa'ida or al-Qaeda is rendered as "Al'Qaeda," which 
is erroneous. The author attributes the June 25, 1996, terrorist attack at 
Khobar Towers to Usama bin Ladin, when in fact Iranian-backed terror-
ists carried out the act. The author's citation of seven state sponsors of 
terror is several years out of date (there are now four). Other data points 
cited regarding the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, 
counter-terror organizations, and the Department of Homeland Security, 
are outdated by a few years and placed in improper context. The author 
also uses citations from sources whose agendas are not clearly stated, pre-
senting a perspective devoid of context.
In spite of these glaring issues, Aviation and Airport Security: Terrorism 
and Safety Concerns has value in that it provides a wide-based view of 
aviation security, and in a wide-ranging sense it is generally correct. How-
ever, the process breaks down when the author tries to provide specificity 
on topics other than those she copied and pasted from the Internet (and 
even some of those are incorrect). Perhaps the book's merits might be as a 
reference of topics to pursue. For those seeking counter-threat and 
counter-terror solutions to better protect the transportation infrastruc-
ture, this tome is useful, but not by any stretch of the imagination a defin-
itive guidebook or manual.
Mark J. Roberts is a transportation security subject matter expert. He 
has published strategy articles and a book with the National Defense 
University Press, as well as numerous book reviews in various journals.
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Executive Measures, Terrorism and National Security: Have 
the Rules of the Game Changed? By David Bonner. Ashgate 
Publishing, Ltd., 2007. ISBN 978-0-7546-4756-0 (hardcover). 
Abbreviations. Footnotes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xi, 371. 
$124.95.
History is one of several fundamental elements in our society. It can easily 
help us picture what happened before, and some of us may use it to 
refrain from repeating the same mistakes. From the same rationale, some 
may have different views of the importance of case laws, but I value them 
from a perspective that reflects current views from various social beliefs, 
thoughts, and attitudes at a specific time toward certain subjects and 
events in our lives. Henceforth, knowing how certain decisions were 
arrived at will be immeasurably important for us in the future. The author 
presents past and present historical events in order to illustrate how the 
U.K. Government handled terrorism and other national security affairs, 
which were supported by examples in using legal mechanisms instead of 
using existing or newly developed criminal laws or processes. The author 
describes specific methods that were formulated and executed as national 
strategic actions: prevention, pursuit, and protection, such as internment, 
deportation, and restriction on movement during its colonial withdrawal 
in Cyprus, Kenya, and Malaya, and in dealing with the political violence in 
Ireland.
Professor David Bonner has taught at the School of Law, University of 
Leicester, U.K., since 1974 and was a former student of that institute. As a 
lawyer, Bonner specializes in laws relating to terrorism, among other 
interests. He has also written a monograph on measures other than crimi-
nal prosecution to deal with terrorism and national security issues.
In Chapter 1, the author uses comparisons with early U.K. history to 
clearly point out that the rules of "games" have not been changed for the 
U.K. in pursuit of protecting against further terrorist incidents. Further-
more, the author claims that methods and plans for dealing with "sleeper 
cells or supporters" remain the same compared to previous governmental 
reactive responses throughout history.
Some will find this book valuable in regard to past history of how some 
national crises were handled via methods of internment, restriction of 
movement, exclusion, and deportation of selected individuals. But others 
may not value this book, particularly those who seek answers to compre-
hend sensitive current policies in handling both internal and external 
threats to nations. Some readers may want to skip chapters two through 
five and read the rest of the chapters if the readers' views and analysis on 
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government actions and reactions of the September 11, 2001 attack on 
U.S. soil are the main points of interest.
This book may be ideal for legal scholars or government officials in the 
U.S. to study current actions or policies on dealing with sleeper cells or 
supporters before and after the major attacks on both soils, but it is not 
clear if it will benefit professionals in intelligence, counterintelligence, 
and protection fields. The author's view of an effective counter-terrorism 
or counter-insurgency strategy centers on intelligence-led policing. The 
U.S. Department of Justice suggested the same approach in its 2009 
report, Navigating Your Agency's Path to Intelligence-Led Policing.
The author suggests that any decision on national security matters must 
be balanced to ensure that fundamental rights are protected, but I would 
add that preservation of human life should be the uppermost, indispens-
able, and indisputable task for anyone who is in any executive position.
This book should be of interest to political scientists, historians, and law-
yers, as suggested by the author, but should be only limited to those who 
have keen interests in executive decisions. When discussing actual events, 
some information was inaccurate, such as the flight number for one of the 
planes that crashed on September 11, 2001, and the date of the London 
bombing in 2005. In addition, the book's binding appears unable to han-
dle the rigors of library use. I would expect to find this book in the law 
library of larger universities or reference sections in city or state libraries, 
but most likely not in individual homes.
Jeff Ahn is a retired U.S. Army CID special agent currently working as a 
security manager for the Defense Logistics Agency Pacific. He is an 
adjunct faculty member at three universities. 
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Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA's Spytechs from 
Communism to Al-Qaeda. By Robert Wallace and H. Keith 
Melton, with Henry Robert Schlesinger. New York: Dutton, 
2008. ISBN 978-0-525-94980-0 (hardcover). Sketches. Maps. 
Photographs. Glossary. Notes. Sources cited. Index. Select 
Bibliography. $29.95.
This is an excellent book that tells both "who done it" and "how it's done." 
It is primarily a history focused on the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) 
technical support capabilities resident in the Directorate of Science and 
Technology. According to the jacket cover, the two primary authors are 
well qualified by experience and interests. Robert Wallace is a retired 
career CIA officer and former Director of the Office of Technical Services. 
H. Keith Melton is the technical tradecraft historian at the Interagency 
Training Center. Henry Schlesinger is an author and journalist covering 
intelligence technologies, counter-terrorism, and law enforcement.
The foreword by George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence, 1997–
2007, sets the stage well, with a focus on how the technical services have 
largely been neglected in the literature. He clearly states how important 
their contributions have been and how they will remain critical. When 
read in conjunction with The Master of Disguise by Antonio J. Mendez, 
one will have a more well-rounded understanding of intelligence and the 
interaction of the capabilities that create a valuable national asset.
In the steadily increasing intelligence literature, there are several primary 
book types ranging from lopsidedly critical to exploitative. But then there 
is the rarest and most valuable type: a well-written book based on per-
sonal knowledge and experience that fills a major gap for the serious 
reader. This is such a book and should be part of every serious student's 
and practitioner's personal library, as well as public and institutional 
libraries. We are once again shown that Intelligence History remains a 
fascinating and ever-evolving subject.
Educators should read and consider this book for inclusion in any intelli-
gence history and even technology history courses. There are few books 
that relate technology to real-world applications better; and almost none 
outside of the aircraft and satellite arenas that relate technology to intelli-
gence operations. David Kahn, of course, being the most distinguished 
exception.
Clearly the authors intended this to be a basic early history, taking one 
through the real beginning of American tools and techniques to a point 
where both technology and operations are best left out. While the Internet 
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is touched upon, it is useful only to point the way from traditional in-place 
operations to today's new, "reach out and touch almost everyone and 
everything remotely" world. Such a speculative discussion would have 
clearly been unnecessary, out of place, and a real distraction and detrac-
tion from the book's significant value. This is an informative and enter-
taining history, not a sensationalist "future history."
Spycraft provides significant insights into one of the lesser known and 
appreciated critical intelligence components: successfully applying tech-
nologies supporting case officer and agent operations. While much more 
has been written about specific operations, rings, and individuals, pre-
cious little has been written about the "little things" that enable successful 
operations. Here we are carefully and often entertainingly led through the 
evolution of making things smaller, more reliable, more productive, and 
above all safer to use. The authors pull back the Hollywood hype and 
show where the imagination, courage, and derring-do of those not in the 
literature or popular media's eyes often made a profound difference. In 
fact, these are the ones who made many critical collection operations even 
possible. Perhaps this can be well illustrated by modifying a popular 
quote usually attributed to General Omar Bradley: "Congress makes a 
man a general, communications makes him a commander," to: "Case 
officers can recruit an agent, covert communications makes the agent a 
spy."
A great deal of history is well laid out in several nicely organized sections. 
Within the sections are well written chapters on technical and operational 
episodes that carry one seamlessly between organization history, person-
alities, technologies, operations, and above all the "luck" factor. People 
are brought to life as select operations and technical developments are 
explored with an excellent interweaving of scientists, engineers, field 
officers, and even psychologists (considered by many to be the real "Wiz-
ards of Langley") becoming parts of an interesting and very informative 
history. The illustrations are well done and the equipment, tools, and doc-
ument photographs are very useful. The non-technical and the technical 
are made clear for anyone from either camp, and most importantly for the 
general public.
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Here are just a few of many insights and knowledge to be gained, but not 
too many, which would spoil the fun: technical ops work at the nexus of 
two immutable laws; Faraday's Laws of Electrolysis and Murphy's Law; 
sometimes the simple is as effective as a sophisticated and complex collec-
tion device; a smart and courageous spouse can provide an elegant and 
very effective solution to a problem baffling an entire team; in the field 
there is no substitute for a smart and knowledgeable improvising techie; 
Luck remains the most critical factor in all Intelligence operations.
Lloyd H. Hoffman is a professor at Henley-Putnam University. 
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Troublesome Young Men: The Rebels who brought Churchill 
to Power and Saved England. By Lynne Olson, New York: 
Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2007. ISBN-10: 0-374-53133-1 
(paperback). Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. pp. 436. 
$15.00.
To those of the Cold War generation, "appeasement" was an utterly deri-
sive epithet in discourse about international relations. Ms. Olson's book 
brings into focus whether "appeasement" has not become fashionable 
again in the guise of discourse, engagement, and diplomacy. Her book is 
not only a gripping account of the events leading up to the Second World 
War in British politics; it is another warning that those who fail to remem-
ber history are condemned to repeat it. As such, it is a worthwhile 
re-study of Conservative Party politics in inter-war Britain and bears 
comparison to the way that the leaders of both major United States par-
ties have dealt with aggressive rogue states in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries, particularly on the issue of the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan. 
This book earns itself a valuable place as a study in international relations 
or as an important case study in the role of domestic politics and interper-
sonal dynamics in the formulation of foreign policy.
Ms. Olson is a highly capable and thorough historian and journalist. She 
is well equipped to set the historical stage in a detailed and thoughtful 
manner. She is also careful to present our historical heroes in a delight-
fully human manner, with all their petulancies and peccadilloes.
One of the most dramatic episodes recounted in her book is the moment 
when the troublesome Tory backbenchers, who chaffed against the avow-
edly appeasement policies of then Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, 
finally rebelled and walked away from their myopic, sinister, and 
self-deceitful leader after the German invasion of Poland in 1939.
While Churchill was to be lionized as the great leader against appease-
ment, Ms. Olson shows that all too often this great man was captive of his 
class, his friends, and his own political ambitions. Perhaps the most shat-
tering historical moment presented is when Arthur Greenwood, the 
uncharismatic Deputy Leader of the Labour Party rose to answer Cham-
berlain's pusillanimous response to the German attack on Britain's treaty 
ally, Poland, a stiff note demanding that the Nazis withdraw to their bor-
ders in September 1939. Greenwood rose and began to speak slowly and 
tentatively. He said, "With no opportunity to think about what I should 
say...I speak what is in my heart at the moment." Leo Amery, throwing 
decorum to the wind, shouted out, "Speak for England, Arthur." With this 
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one phrase, Amery and Greenwood, Conservatives and Labour, were able 
to begin the bitter and bloody job of regaining England's honor. Thus they 
paved the way for the eventual elevation of Churchill as the wartime 
leader of Great Britain.
Looking backwards, it is easy to view history's course as inevitable. Ms. 
Olson portrays quite a different situation. Churchill and the 
anti-appeasers were by no means an historical inevitability. Left to its 
own inertia the Tory party might indeed have acquiesced to Hitler's con-
quest of Poland, as it had of Czechoslovakia and Austria. The Tory back 
benchers were not a uniform, single minded group and dissipated much 
of their energies on private agendas. Sometimes it takes an outsider to 
congeal potentially great men into a heroic team.
The relevance of Ms. Olson's book today is clear when thrown against the 
shadow of ineffective and weakly-pursued policies to stop the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons amongst rogue states. The only example of force-
ful intervention by the leadership of our own government has been the 
quixotic jostling of the former President George W. Bush against an Iraqi 
nuclear program that did not in fact exist and that no serious student of 
nuclear proliferation thought existed.
Progressive red lines in the sand, drawn by both parties, have been 
ignored by Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. The fear of near-term conse-
quences has overshadowed the fear of long-term consequences. Diplo-
matic dilatory rhetoric has replaced the use of meaningful action, whether 
it is military, economic, or unconventional warfare. Precious time has 
been lost as those who would wish us harm have grown stronger and our 
options have narrowed. We should ask Ms. Olson—"Who shall speak for 
America and the generations that will undoubtedly suffer as too many 
voices pursued 'peace in our time'? Let us pray that we can muster the 
same nonpartisan courage as Amery, Greenwood, and Churchill and 
speak up for our values and our honor before the fate of generations to 
come is sealed in a nuclear doomsday.
Donald J. Goldstein is a faculty member of Henley-Putnam University.
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